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THE FOUR AGES OF HEALTH LAW
Rand E. Rosenblattt
AMERICAN HEALTH LAW continues to be shaped largely by
three familiar models. Each model was dominant in a particular his-
torical period, although that dominance was usually contested by one
or more of the other models. The most complete hegemony was
achieved by the first model, the authority of the medical profession,
from roughly 1880 to 1960. Under this paradigm, legal authority over
virtually all aspects of health care delivery was delegated to the medi-
cal profession-indeed to individual physicians in private practice-
and justified primarily by what was seen as doctors' scientific exper-
tise.
A second model, which became dominant in health law from
about 1960 to about 1980 and continues to the present, is that of the
modestly egalitarian social contract. This paradigm holds that pa-
tients and society as a whole, as well as physicians and other stake-
holders, have legitimate rights and interests in the health care system.
The role of law in this model is to achieve a fair resolution of conflict-
ing interests, especially in the light of highly unequal information and
power between patients and other actors. Given this model's egalitar-
ian values, fairness has typically been articulated as access to care
largely on the basis of medical need, high quality of care, and respect
for patient autonomy and dignity. By the standards of the rest of the
developed world, notably western Europe and Canada, the American
social contract has been limited and uneven-hence the phrase "mod-
estly egalitarian."
A third perspective holds that however modest by international
standards, the American social contract is far too regulatory and redis-
tributive, and should be replaced by legal principles appropriate to
full-fledged market competition. The function of law in this model is
to ensure that choices about health insurance and health services are
made by individuals based on their own financial resources (assuming
them to be above some specified minimum), and (in some versions of
the model) to eliminate as much as possible hidden "cross-subsidies."
Individual (or aggregated individual) choice under financial constraint
is believed to maximize efficiency (people want to pay only for cov-
t Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law--Camden.
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erage or services that really benefit them, and providers will respond
to such market pressure by economizing) and freedom, properly un-
derstood. The market competition model developed in the early
1970s, began affecting policy very quickly, and became the dominant
paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s.1
Each of these three models continues to exercise influence in po-
litical and legal contexts. While it is unlikely that we would ever
again delegate to doctors the sweeping authority they enjoyed before
1960, the ideal of the trustworthy, independent physician delivering
the best possible medical care for her or his individual patients still
has powerful appeal or, as some market advocates see it, pernicious
influence.2 Similarly, while the egalitarian social contract model has
been subjected to relentless intellectual and political criticism, the idea
of access to health care on the basis of medical need remains attrac-
tive, and the countervision of health care distributed according to abil-
ity to pay remains troubling for public opinion and explicit policy. 3
For my own earlier discussions of these models, see RAND E. ROSENBLATT
ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2-3, 24-35, 131-35, 823-24
(1997) (providing background for and comparisons among the three models); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Health Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 147
passim (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (summarizing the three models of American
health law: professional authority and autonomy, egalitarian social contract, and
market competition); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Conceptualizing Health Law for Teaching
Purposes: The Social Justice Perspective, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489 (1988) (discussing
how to teach the three models of health law to students). For structures that are con-
ceptually similar, see Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1451, 1452 (1994) (arguing that health law policy employs four different para-
digms to allocate resources: market, professional, moral, and political); James A.
Morone, The Health Care Bureaucracy: Small Changes, Big Consequences, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 723, 723 (1993) (describing "three working models of au-
thority in health care politics: professional, democratic, and bureaucratic (with an
additional handful of largely theoretical alternatives, most notably the free market)").
Cf M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 253-54
(2003) (identifying the emerging dominant health law and policy paradigm as "wel-
fare maximization" or "traditional economic reasoning," and arguing that it is not
pragmatically realizable); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV.
463, 465-66 (2002) (identifying social justice and economic efficiency as proposed
and competing "unifying themes" for health law, and advocating instead the concept
of "therapeutic jurisprudence"). For discussion of the public health and bioethics
models, see infra text accompanying notes 5-9.
2 For an example of the perceived appeal, see Hall, supra note 1 (arguing
that trust is essential in the physician-patient relationship). For an example regarding
the perceived pernicious effects, see Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revo-
lution Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 55, 72-73 (explaining
that because the courts have not "replace[d] the old professional paradigm of medical
care... the legal system [thus] stands as a major obstacle to empowering consumers
and completing the health care revolution").
3 On recent public attitudes, see Elizabeth A. Pendo, Images of Health In-
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Yet, it is also true that many in more affluent socio-economic groups
appear uncomfortable with the implications of universal coverage, and
favor or at least acquiesce in some version of the market model. This
is because their deepest commitment is to unrestrained access for
themselves to the latest medical technology, combined with a fear that
extending such access to all would be too costly and would result ei-
ther in higher premiums and taxes and/or rationing applicable to eve-
ryone, including themselves. 4 The result is that all three perspectives
surance in Popular Film: The Dissolving Critique, J. Health L. (forthcoming 2004)
(citing Fundamental Health Care Values, HARRIS INTERACTIVE HEALTH
CARE NEWS, Mar. 14, 2003, at 1-2, at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newslettershealthcare.asp (75% of respon-
dents "agree that 'people who are unemployed or poor should be able to get the same
amount and quality of medical services as people who have good jobs and are paying
substantial taxes,"' and 69% of respondents "disagree that 'it's fair that people who
pay more in taxes (or in health insurance premiums) should be able to get better
medical care than those who pay little or nothing."' Regarding subsidizing of the sick
by the healthy, 60% of respondents "disagree[ ] that 'it is unfair to take money
through taxes from the young and middle-aged who work to pay for the medical care
of those who are old and sick' and 57% of respondents "disagree[ ] that 'it's unfair
to require the majority of people who are healthy to pay for most of the cost of treat-
ing those who are sick and are heavy users of hospitals and doctors."')). These results
are consistent with responses to same questions polled by Louis Harris & Associates
(the predecessor of Harris Interactive) in 1991, id., and with other survey findings.
See also Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1485 n. 111 (citing JOHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES?
WHO DIES? 180 (1990) and stating that "a consistent majority of Americans have
opposed allowing ability to pay to be a criterion affecting the allocation of medical
resources"). In addition, Alan Enthoven, a prominent advocate of a market competi-
tion approach to health care delivery, wrote in 1980 that "[m]ost Americans consider
access to a decent level of medical care to be part of the right to 'life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.' Thus we are not willing to leave the distribution of medical
purchasing power to the market and other forces that determine income distribution."
ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE
SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 81 (1980). See also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST,
DISENEITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH - CARE PROGRAMS
AND A RIGHTS - BASED RESPONSE 23-109 (2003) (analyzing numerous ways that
American law and policy do and do not recognize a right to health care); Deborah
Stone, Managed Care and the Second Great Transformation, 24 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 1213, 1214-17 (1999) (While noting that the "backlash" against managed
care is driven by the self-interest of those who have health insurance, and coincided
(at least in the late 1990s) with a relative lack of concern for the over 43 million who
are uninsured, the backlash can also be interpreted in more solidaristic terms as "a
cold shudder against the market paradigm, which, taken to its logical endpoint as
managed care seems to be doing, respects no human bonds, shows no mercy, and has
no use for kindness, loyalty, and other moral qualities of community"). See also
sources reporting countervailing or ambivalent public attitudes in note 4 infra.
4 See, e.g., James A. Morone, Populists in a Global Market, 24 J. POL.
POL'Y & L. 887, 891 (1999) (interpreting the managed care backlash as a defense of
"that honored American tradition: rationing by class. The wealthy have always gotten
lavish care, the middle classes have done fine, the poor and uninsured faced depriva-
2004]
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have been contending actively for influence over numerous issues of
health policy and law.
Two other models deserve mention: public health and bioethics.
Many of the advances in health status and outcomes in the United
States and other developed countries between 1850 and 1950 occurred
not because of hospital science or individual treatment, but because of
public health science: scientifically-informed sanitation, water supply,
food inspection, housing reform, vaccination, public health education,
and accurate diagnosis and isolation of the contagiously ill.5 How-
ever, the influence of the public health model was effectively margin-
alized by the medical profession (and other powerful economic and
political actors) for most of the twentieth century, because it threat-
ened to drain resources from profitable fee-for-service treatment of
tion (amid long speculation about just how 'deserving' they may have been)."). By
imposing care restrictions on middle- and upper-middle class patients, managed care
violated this tradition and provoked the backlash. See also DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
BEGINNINGS COUNT: THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 4-
6 (1997) (discussing the unlimited access to healthcare technology that middle class
Americans have demanded and its effect on preventing universal access to health
care); but see Grant Reeher, Reform and Remembrance: The Place of the Private
Sector in the Future of Health Care Policy, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 355, 361-
62 (2003) (reporting "long-term public opinion about health care and health care
reform is ambiguous and apparently contradictory and often is [factually] wrong").
See also Robin Toner, Boiling Brew: Politics and Health Insurance Gap, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2003, at A19 (discussing the "political paralysis" that has occurred in the
past when "middle-income voters sense[d] that they are being asked to pay more so
that others get health care"). Public opinion expert Bill Mclnturff has projected that
"[a] lot of 2004 will be a fight about who is perceived to pay versus who is perceived
to get the benefit." Id.
5 "One of the most dominant ideas in nineteenth-century medicine had been
that social conditions foster disease. [P]ublic health workers [ ] repeatedly showed
that people living in bad social and economic conditions were much more vulnerable
to the great infectious scourges that still assaulted the modem world." MELVIN
KONNER, MEDICINE AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE 82 (1993). The
great example is tuberculosis, widely but mistakenly believed to have been cured by
Robert Kochs discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus in 1882. In fact, the fatal effects
of tuberculosis that struck down the English poet John Keats and millions of his con-
temporaries in the 18th and 19th centuries began diminishing in the more prosperous
parts of Europe in the 1850s, long before Kochs discovery. See, e.g., THOMAS
DORMANDY, THE WHITE DEATH: A HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS 78, 224 ( 2000).
Tracking improvements in nutrition, housing, and workplace conditions remarkably
closely, tuberculosis mortality continued to decline rapidly after 1900, e.g. about an
eight-fold decline in the United States between 1900 and 1950, well before the first
effective antibiotic, streptomycin, was discovered by Selman Wacksman and became
available in 1950. See, e.g., David Rosner, Twentieth Century Medicine, in THE
COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 483, 504 (Richard W. Bulliett ed., 1998);
DORMANDY, supra, at 82, 224-25.
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individual patients and, more broadly, to criticize social inequality. 6
In the late twentieth century, increasing evidence of the link between
low income and other oppressive social conditions and poor health has
resurrected the egalitarian side of nineteenth-century public health,
thereby potentially linking it (once again) to a strongly egalitarian
version of the social contract paradigm.7
Beginning in the mid-1960s, a series of courageous whistleblow-
ers (notably Dr. Henry Beecher of the Harvard Medical School) re-
vealed shocking disregard for patient well being in medical experi-
mentation undertaken at leading universities and by the United States
Public Health Service in the notorious "Tuskegee experiment. '' 8 For a
6 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICrNE
180-97 (1982).
7 In 1952, Rene and Jean Dubos said of tuberculosis, "Tuberculosis is a
social disease . . . the impact of social and economic factors on the individual [must]
be considered as much as the mechanisms by which tubercle bacilli cause damage to
the human body." RENEE DUBOS & JEAN DUBOS, THE WHITE PLAGUE:
TUBERCULOSIS, MAN AND SOCIETY xxxvii (Rutgers Univ. Press 1987) (1952). The
point is equally relevant and dramatic today with respect to AIDS in our time: the
high rates of infection and mortality in parts of Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America
and Asia are caused not so much by the HIV virus itself, which we now know how to
contain by education and chemotherapy, but by political, economic and cultural con-
ditions. See, e.g., PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER (2003) (giving case histo-
ries and citing numerous sources); Helen Epstein, The Mystery of AIDS in South
Africa, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 20, 2000, at 50-55 (discussing the views expressed by
the government and the secrecy surrounding clinical trials in South Africa); Elisabeth
Rosenthal, In Rural China, a Steep Price of Poverty: Dying of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.28, 2000, at AI (discussing the rise of AIDS in rural China and the denial of the
Chinese government to acknowledge the rising issue). See also David Mechanic,
Who Shall Lead: Is There a Future for Population Health?, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 421 (2003) (discussing both the history and the recent developments in popula-
tion health and analyzing the challenges to making population health concerns an
important part of our current health policy); Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins, A
Rightful Place for Public Health in American Law, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 302
(2002) (acknowledging the importance of public health as a discipline and arguing
that it is time for the topic to be addressed in legal education). For a related but
somewhat different version of the debate distinguishing between so-called "new" and
"old" public health paradigms, see Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His
Last: A Defense of the "'Old" Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOL. & MED. S138 (Supp.
2003) (arguing that public health is efficient and therefore justified only when it fo-
cuses on its purportedly "old" function of containment of infectious diseases rather
than the "new" function of regulating any area that affects the general health of a
large number of individuals) and Lawrence 0. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Poli-
tics of Public Health: A Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. Bio. & MED. S160 (Supp.
2003) (finding benefits to the "new" public health and attributing Epstein's efficiency
arguments to his own political and moral preferences). Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine is available to subscribers through Project Muse, http://muse.jhu.edu.
8 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How
LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 1-4, 70-84 (1991).
2004]
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number of political and bureaucratic reasons, this stimulated the de-
velopment of new rules for informed consent and other ethical aspects
of medical experimentation. The development of new technologies
for prolonging life from the 1960s onwards, and the question of when
these technologies should be withdrawn, further strengthened the in-
fluence of bioethics on experimentation and life-prolonging technol-
ogy.
9
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it is possible that we are
entering a "fourth age" of health law and policy, and indeed of law
and policy more generally. In part, this may be because the three ma-
jor models have been unable to reconcile in a credible and legitimate
way our society's (or at least its politically-influential sectors') simul-
taneous and arguably contradictory values regarding health care: (1)
solidarity and mutual aid, which in the United States is often under-
stood as including unrestricted access to the most advanced medical
technology; (2) efficiency and cost containment; and (3) no or mini-
mal governmental interference with the ability of health care entre-
preneurs, pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, physicians
and other well-situated players to make very large incomes and prof-
its. l0 Interacting with and transcending these conflicts are two other
potential major components of a fourth age: globalization, which
many see as having profound effects on the nation-state, democracy,
and the feasibility and nature of a social contract; and what is known
as "the biotechnology revolution," also expected to pose major di-
Credit for exposure of the Tuskegee Study goes to Peter Buxton, a junior non-
physician employee of the Public Health Service who was not involved with the
Study. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Sylvia A. Law & Sara Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at
890-91 (citing sources).
9 See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 8 (explaining that as technology in-
creased, doctors lost much of their discretion concerning the care of their patients);
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5 'h
ed. 2001); Alexander M. Capron, A "Bioethics" Approach to Teaching Health Law,
38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1988) (discussing how bioethics is a core concern of teaching
health law). For a work that connects the bioethics and egalitarian public health mod-
els, see HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999).
10 See note 4 supra. See generally Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The
Redistributive Agenda behind Market-Based Health Care Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 427 (1997); Mark V. Pauly, Who Was that Straw Man Anyway? A Com-
ment on Evans and Rice, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 467 (1997); Robert G. Evans,
Response: Coarse Correction- And Way Off Target, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
503 (1997). For a pervasive sense of political and policy complexity, drift, denial,
and paralysis in the health care sector (albeit with some contributors perceiving or
advocating various ways forward), see Special Conference Issue: Who Shall Lead?,
28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 181-24 (2003).
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lemmas and have deep ramifications. As discussed below, the mean-
ing and direction of this new age is sharply contested.
Part One of this article explores the three major models of health
law, including judicial opinions that exemplify each model's style of
reasoning. Part Two then considers briefly the debate about the pos-
sibilities of a "fourth age."
Two matters require some preliminary clarification. First, the
term "social contract" is used in this article to refer to statutes and
judicial doctrines that seek to articulate an explicitly social or politi-
cal, as distinguished from what is known as a professional or market,
conception of fairness and good policy. This distinction is not in-
tended to imply that professional and market conceptions are not
themselves "social" in nature, and derive instead from an allegedly
"natural" source, such as "science" or "the laws of economics." The
professional and market approaches to health law, like all models of
law or policy regarding health or anything else, are socially created. I
Even models that appear to minimize the role of society and govern-
ment-such as so-called "unregulated markets"-rest on extensive
social and governmental value choices, authority and, if need be, co-
ercion.' 2 The phrase "modestly egalitarian social contract" empha-
sizes the social (primarily legislative or judicial) source of egalitarian
" See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark De-
Wolfe Howe ed., 1963) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intui-
tions of public policy, avowed or unconscious.., have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed."). See
also PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (1999) (arguing that the culture of the law's rules needs to be studied
like any other culture to discover their founding myths, beliefs, methodologies, and
historical sources). For a specific example from the history of health care delivery,
see Paul Starr's account of the rise of the modem hospital. STARR, supra note 6
(discussing the rise of the modem hospital). "What drove this transformation was not
simply the advance of science, important thought that was, but the demands and ex-
ample of an industrializing capitalist society, which brought larger numbers of people
into urban centers, detached them from traditions of self-sufficiency, and projected
ideals of specialization and technical competence." Id. at 146. See also Thomas
Morawetz, Insurance: How It Matters as Psychological Fact and Political Metaphor,
6 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 7-10 (1999-2000) (noting that the debates about health care and
insurance necessarily revisit all of the main questions of politics).
12 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 1216-17 (discussing the changing of life
and health into objects of commerce, and the backlash against managed care as soci-
ety's response); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) (discussing the
social implications of the emergence of the market economy); David M. Frankford,
Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic to Cure Legal Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (1992) [hereinafter Privatizing Health Care] (arguing that advocates of
market competition in health care delivery confuse naturalistic causality with human
freedom).
2004]
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legal norms, while not meaning to imply that the professional author-
ity and market competition perspectives are not also socially created
and authorized.
Second, the notion of a model refers primarily to the assumptions,
values, background norms, orientations, etc., of private and govern-
mental decisionmakers. Thus, when I say that the professional author-
ity model was dominant from about 1880 to about 1960, I mean that
one can see the influence of the model in such contexts as legislation,
judicial opinions, positions of the American Medical Association, and
hospital bylaws and practices. Interestingly, at the time of their domi-
nance, neither the professional authority nor social contract models
generated a large and highly visible "advocacy" academic literature
that sought to promote those models. In contrast, the market competi-
tion perspective has indeed generated such a literature, some of which
distinguishes itself sharply from the "market model" that has actually
been implemented as a matter of health law and policy. '
3
I. PART ONE: THREE MODELS OF HEALTH LAW
A. The Model of Professional Authority
The model of professional authority dominated health law and
policy in the United States from about 1880 to about 1960.14 During
this period the main point of health law-its more or less conscious
purpose-was to support the authority and autonomy of individual
physicians engaged in the private practice of medicine. Thus the law
allowed and even aided doctors to suppress salaried and prepaid fi-
nancial arrangements, and to insist on being paid a fee for each dis-
crete service, thereby maximizing physician control over the terms
and amount of payment. 15 The law also gave doctors control over
13 See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 2, at 72-74 (arguing that even though
consumers have been given more choices in their health care, the system fails con-
sumers by looking to custom and consensus in the medical community with respect to
such matters as malpractice and insurance coverage); James Maxwell & Peter Temin,
Managed Competition Versus Industrial Purchasing of Health Care Among the For-
tune 500, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 5 (2002) (contrasting managed competition
theory with actual health purchasing practices of most major American corporations).
14 For a comprehensive and brilliant presentation of the origins and rise of
this model see STARR, supra note 6, at 79-378. See also Mark A. Peterson, Introduc-
tion: Who Shall Lead?, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 181, 182 (2003) (citing litera-
ture supporting the proposition that the professional leadership model was predomi-
nant for most of the twentieth century).
15 See STARR, supra note 6, at 198-34.; People ex rel. Kemer v. United Med.
Service, Inc., 200 N.E. 157 (111. 1936) (ordering closure of for-profit clinic that
wished to employ doctors on a salaried basis).
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licensing standards and enforcement, 6 what patients they would ac-
cept, 7 hospital policies regarding doctors,' 8 and what patients should
be told about their treatment, if anything.' 9 With respect to medical
malpractice liability, the "medical custom" and "locality rule" doc-
trines meant that in many contexts, a patient could only recover for
injuries if a local colleague of the defendant doctor testified that he
had committed negligence. 20 Needless to say, this was a requirement
that usually could not be satisfied. This sweeping delegation of au-
thority to physicians was later justified on a theory of "agency": the
doctor could and should be trusted to act as the knowledgeable agent
for the patient's well being.2' At the time, the equation of the doctor's
purported scientific expertise with sound public policy was so obvious
as barely to merit discussion.
A paradigm case from the age of professional authority is Judge
Cardozo's 1914 opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in
Schloendorff v. Society Of New York Hospital22  The issue was
whether the hospital had legal responsibility for an operation having
been performed on a patient without her consent, despite the patient
having made several efforts to explain to the resident physician, the
nurse preparing her for the procedure, and the physician administering
the anesthetic, that she was consenting only to an "examination" and
not to an "operation. 2 3 While Judge Cardozo famously articulated
the patient's right to decide what should happen to her own body,
24
16 E.g., ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 968-69 (discussing licensure
history and grounds for disciplining a physician).
17 See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding that neither
state licensure nor the common law limits a physician's freedom to refuse to render
services to any person seeking to employ the physician).
18 See, e.g., St. John's Hosp. Med. Staff v. St. John Reg.'l Med. Ctr., 245
N.W.2d 472, 473-74 (S.D. 1976) (finding bylaws created and passed by the medical
staff could not be altered by the hospital's board of directors without the consent of
the medical staff).
19 E.g., ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 890-91 (listing sources).
20 See Jon R. Walz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medi-
cal Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 408, 410-11 (1969) (discussing the
history and legal implications of the locality rule's role in medical malpractice litiga-
tion)
21 See, e.g., Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Agency, Contract, and Governance:
Shifting Shapes ofAccountability in the Health Care Arena, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 195, 197 (2003) (relating the agency principle of microeconomics to the rela-
tionship in health care between patient and physician).
22 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
23 The patient's allegations were not surprisingly contested by the doctors
and nurses, but since the hospital had won in the trial court by directed verdict, the
appeals court had to assume that the patient's allegations were true. Id. at 93.
24 "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
2004]
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25the issue of hospital liability was a different matter. Cardozo could
imagine only one theory that supported hospital liability: that the hos-
pital was the employer ("master") who controlled everyone involved
in the treatment process, including the eminent surgeon who per-
formed the operation. Since this seemed starkly contrary to actual
fact-no hospital administrator (who in those days was typically not
even a physician) would presume to "control" an eminent surgeon in
the details of his work-it must follow that the hospital had no re-
sponsibility at all for any part of the process, including the alleged
failure of the nurse (who was indeed the hospital's employee) to in-
form the surgeon of the patient's wishes.26 Similarly, when a for-
profit corporation established a low-cost clinic in Chicago in the
1930s where salaried and licensed physicians could treat patients, the
Illinois Supreme Court granted a request for an injunction by the At-
torney General to shut the clinic down, on the theory that the corpora-
tion was practicing medicine without a license (and, of course, was
not eligible to obtain a license, which could be granted only to indi-
viduals). The court summarily dismissed the corporation's argument
that "it" was not practicing medicine, but only providing a place
where the doctors would practice (and undoubtedly provide services
to patients who could not afford the charges of fee-for-service medi-
cine).27
Strikingly absent in these "all or nothing" opinions is the possibil-
ity of shared or overlapping responsibility, so evident to modern eyes
accustomed to looking at complex institutional structures and relation-
ships. That a judge as thoughtful as Cardozo could not see this is a
testament to the power of the professional authority model of health
law. So strong was the belief in, and commitment to, the physician's
authority over patient care, that any suggestion that the authority be
mine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Id.
25 The statement in note 24, infra, evidently contemplates potential liability
for the surgeon, but there is no discussion in Cardozo's opinion of any lawsuit against
or settlement with the surgeon who performed the operation. If indeed the surgeon
was not sued, one can speculate about the reasons, including the possibility that the
patient may not have spoken directly to the surgeon, and therefore was relying on
hospital employees such as the nurses, or on arguable agents of the hospital such as
the anesthetist, to convey her message
26 See id. at 94-95 (stating that physicians and surgeons are professional men
and in no way bound to control by hospital administrators and that though nurses are
employees of the hospital they are acting on the orders of the physicians and not the
hospital itself).
27 People ex rel. Kerner v. United Med. Service, Inc., 200 N.E. 157, 163-64
(Ill. 1936).
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shared was perceived as a complete denial of the physician's author-
ity, and hence, unthinkable.
While providing doctors with sweeping control over health care,
the professional authority model also set the limits of the problems it
could solve, and therefore contained the seeds of its own fall from
dominance. Three issues in particular were beyond its ken. The first
was access to adequate (or any) care for people who could not afford
fee-for-service medicine (which included most of the aged) and/or
faced barriers such as race, ethnicity, and geography. "Charity" by
hospitals and individual physicians was supposed to meet this need,
but evidently could not, and even those served often received strik-
ingly inferior care.2 8 "The purpose of publicly sponsored and charita-
ble health services ... was primarily to protect the healthy, well-off
population from the contagiously ill or socially disruptive poor, and to
provide teaching material (in the form of patients) for medical educa-
tion. '[The] health of the individual was secondary, if not inciden-
tal.' ' 29 A huge number of people were effectively excluded from
care, resulting in shock when the nation had to mobilize for World
War II and found that about forty percent of the young men called
were physically unfit to serve.30
Second, physician "self regulation" could not reliably achieve
quality of care, or even police the most egregiously incompetent or
impaired physicians. The mechanisms of self-regulation-
professional and industry-administered accreditation standards and
internal peer review by the hospital's medical staff-generated vague
standards of care, poorly defined procedures, and overlapping and
28 See generally STARR, supra note 6, at 262 (summarizing evidence of lack
of care in the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE (1932)).
29 Rand E. Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medi-
caid Cure, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1975) (quoting ROBERT STEVENS &
ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID
15 (1974)).
30 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A
Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 264-65 (1978) (discussing background to the
Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60
Stat. 1040, which was enacted to increase the availability of health care services). In
2003, this problem remains unsolved to some extent. In addition to 17.3 percent of
the non-elderly population without health insurance, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA, 2002 DATA UPDATE (December 2003),
Figure 2, available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&Pag
elD=29340, "40 percent of all lower-ranking [National] Guard and reserve members
nationwide" lack health insurance when not on active duty, leading to some being
physically unfit for duty when called for active service. Ray Rivera, Legislation
would give reserves insurance, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at B 1.
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rotating committees that diffused responsibility. 3' To expect physi-
cians who had bonded together during intense training, depended on
each other for patient referrals and the financial viability of their hos-
pitals, and shared a strong professional culture of perfectionism and
resistance to criticism to police each other aggressively was fantasy on
its face. The consequences could be extreme. For example, a hospital
medical staff permitted a charming doctor to do complex spinal sur-
gery for which he was totally unqualified.32 He persuaded patients
who did not need the surgery at all to undergo it, paralyzed them
through his incompetence, and then falsified the hospital records to
hide his responsibility. 33 The hospital's defense was that it had fol-
lowed the standards and practices of the accreditation and peer review
process designed and administered by the hospital industry and medi-
cal profession through the private Joint Commission on the Accredita-
tion of Hospitals. Perhaps not surprisingly, a California trial judge
found the system of professional authority inadequate in light of the
socially defined standard of reasonable care.34
Third, the professional authority model had no internal mecha-
nism for controlling costs, other than the vague and voluntary norms
of professionalism. To be sure, as long as patients had to pay for most
care out of their own pockets, their ability to pay operated as a check
on doctors' fees. But as private health insurance, fueled by federal tax
exemption, union contracts, and corporate desire to maintain em-
ployee loyalty spread during the 1940s and 1950s, patients' ability to
pay was no longer limited by their immediate incomes. Thus, doctors
fees and hospitals' costs were free to, and did, rise sharply, especially
after the enactment of public health insurance (Medicare and Medi-
caid) in 1965.
B. The Model of the Egalitarian Social Contract
From the perspective of the modestly egalitarian social contract,
unreviewable physician authority is seen as potentially dangerous and
31 See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 927-28, 933-34 (descibing the
hospital's administrative structure and the diffusion of responsibilities for monitoring
the quality of care); K. J. Williams, The Quandary of the HospitalAdministrator in
Dealing with the Medical Malpractice Problem, 55 NEB. L. REV. 401 (1976) (discuss-
ing how medical staff organization creates problems for medical administrators in
medical malpractice suits).
32 Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Cal. Nov. 19, 1973), reprinted,
in part, in SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF
MALPRACTICE app. at 215-45 (1978).
33 Id.
34 Id.
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self-interested. To achieve fairness in access to care, quality of care,
and the financing of care in a context of inequality between patients
and other actors (doctors, hospitals, insurance companies), the law
must in some circumstances override professional and industry cus-
tom, practices, and contractual arrangements and define and enforce a
"social contract., 35 Under this model, statutes, regulations, and judi-
cial doctrines require health insurance contracts to comply with so-
cially-defined standards of need and fairness,36 and prohibit hospitals
from denying emergency care.37  Similarly, judicial doctrines have
framed informed consent in terms of what a reasonable patient would
want to know, 38 and imposed vicarious and direct liability on hospitals
and managed care organizations (MCOs), regardless of the private
contractual arrangements between the institutions and individual pro-
viders. 39  Other major components of the social contract model in-
clude the federal statutes creating social insurance for the elderly
(Medicare) and a substantial number of the poor (Medicaid),4 ° judicial
doctrines recognizing legal rights for patients and providers in these
programs, 41 and laws prohibiting discrimination in health care on the
basis of race, gender, and disability.
42
35 To be sure, in many contexts and relationships private contracts would
remain enforceable, subject to the general principles of contract and other applicable
law.
36 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that
a Massachusetts state statute mandating coverage of mental health benefits in health
insurance contracts is not preempted by ERISA); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (holding that a state judicial doctrine that permits insurers
to deny claims on grounds of lateness as defined by the policy only if they can show
actual prejudice not preempted by ERISA).
37 E.g., Examination and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and
Women in Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. §1395dd (2000) (providing that an
emergency department must stabilize and screen patients, even those unable to pay);
Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 610-11 (Ariz. 1984) (holding
that patients in need of emergency care must be afforded such care by a state licensed
hospital).
38 E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
39 See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (imposing non-
delegable duty on hospital for quality of emergency room care despite hospital's
argument based on contract with emergency care subcontracter); Darling v. Charles-
ton Community Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965) (applying corporate
liability to hospital despite hospital's argument of contrary industry custom); Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. 1988) (requiring trial on whether
physician is an ostensible agent of an HMO).
40 See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 14-16, 368-410
(Medicare), 410-66 (Medicaid).
41 See, e.g., Duggan v. Bowen, 691 F. Supp. 1487 (D.D.C. 1988) (Medicare);
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (Medicaid). See generally Rand
E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction ofAmerican
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A number of paradigm cases, primarily in the 1950s and 1960s
but extending both earlier and later, held that contrary to Schloendorif,
hospitals have both vicarious and direct (or "corporate") responsibility
for negligence in treating patients.43 The reasoning of these opinions
both reflected and helped constitute the emerging social contract
model of health law. Many factors contributed to this shift in the per-
spective of judges and other policymakers. For example, focusing
only on health care delivery, the growth of Blue Cross and other
forms of private health insurance, notably for hospitalization, from the
mid-1930s onward transformed many formerly charity or near-charity
patients into paying customers, giving hospitals a financial base for
expansion and transformation. The federal Hill-Burton Act, which
provided over four billion dollars in public funds for construction of
public and private non-profit hospitals between 1946 and 1972, high-
lighted the societal importance of adequate hospital facilities and ser-
vices.44 Hospitals themselves, through the American Hospital Asso-
ciation and its state organizations, and (after 1951) through the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO), issued stan-
dards and guidelines that proclaimed the "public service" nature of
hospitals as institutions, and their corporate mission of providing high
quality care.45
Perhaps equally important were the jurisprudential legacy of Le-
gal Realism and the political legacy of the New Deal. Legal Realism
encouraged judges to break out of the all-or-nothing categories of
traditional legal doctrine, look at how institutions were actually func-
Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 439 (1993); Sara Rosenbaum &
David Rousseau, MedicaidAt Thirty-Five, 45 ST. Louis U.L.J. 7 (2001).
42 See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no racially
discriminatory motive or effect in hospital closure); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitel-
baum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System, 3 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICs 215 (2003); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (applying the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k)); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (applying the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
43 In addition to Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8-9 (N.Y. 1957), see Presi-
dent and Dir. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (abolish-
ing charitable immunity for hospitals); Darling v. Charlestown Cmty. Hosp., 211
N.E.2d 253, 260 (I1. 1965) (applying corporate liability to hospital); Thompson v.
Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 708 (Pa. 1991) (same).
44 See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 264-70 (summarizing the legislative
history of and the public benefit endowed by the Hill-Burton Act).
45 See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 917, 93 1 (citing statement made
in 1935 by Dr. Malcolm MacEachem, Director of Professional Relations of the
American Hospital Association to the effect that all hospitals are "public" and have a
responsibility to the community).
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tioning, and craft more flexible legal principles.46 The political legacy
of the New Deal included the view that liberty (and indeed democ-
racy) were threatened when private markets did not enable people to
meet basic human needs; that the inability to meet these needs on a
large scale was not simply aggregated individual failing or the ines-
capable logic of the market, but was rather the product of an interde-
pendent society, and that government could and should intervene in
markets and institutions whose workings threatened fundamental
well-being.47 In 1957, the New York Court of Appeals overruled its
Schloendorff precedent for these kinds of reasons. First, wrote Judge
Fuld in Bing v. Thunig,48 hospitals had been transformed from argua-
bly fragile charities to large, businesslike institutions.
They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physi-
cians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care
and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by
legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of
"hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to
46 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79
YALE L.J. 1153, 1165-72 (1970) (discussing Legal Realism).
47 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (uphold-
ing State's minimum wage for women as a valid constitutional restriction of contrac-
tual liberty, because "the liberty safeguarded [under the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment] is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of
law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the
people"); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eleventh Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 11,
1944), in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 290, 294-95 (John Gabriel
Hunt ed., 1995):
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights .... [a]mong these
[rights] are: [t]he right to a useful and remunerative job ... ; [t]he right to
earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation... ; [t]he
right of every family to a decent home; [t]he right to adequate medical care
and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; [t]he right to ade-
quate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and
unemployment; the right to a good education.
See also Richard B. Stewart, Evaluating the New Deal, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
239, 240 (1998-1999):
First, the New Deal firmly established the proposition that the federal gov-
ernment ought to take responsibility for the overall productivity and health
of the economy at the macro-economic level .... Second, the New Deal es-
tablished the proposition that the federal government has a basic responsi-
bility for protecting individuals and families against the economic risks of
an industrial market economy through various means of social insurance
and assistance.
48 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)
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cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on
their own responsibility.
49
Second, social expectations about due care and fairness had
changed. The idea that certain kinds of institutions and actors should
be flatly immune from damages, and could cause harm without re-
course, violated basic concepts of due care and accountability. "The
rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at variance
with modem-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair deal-
ing."50 Or, as the California Supreme Court stated in a 1963 opinion,
a hospital's demand that patients sign a release from liability for fu-
ture negligence as a condition of admission is unenforceable. "[T]he
hospital cannot claim isolated immunity in the interdependent com-
munity of our time. It, too, is part of the social fabric, and prear-
ranged exculpation from its negligence must partly rend the pattern
and necessarily affect the public interest."5'
Change in the common law liability of hospitals was only a small
part of the social contract phenomenon. The crisis of western capital-
ism in the 1930s, the rise of fascism, and the defeat of and exposure to
the horrors of Nazi Germany in World War II, among other large-
scale factors, led to major changes in political and legal conscious-
ness. There was widespread conviction, embodied in such diverse
forms as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights of 1948,52 the expansion of the European so-
cial welfare systems, and the movements to dismantle the European
empires in Asia and Africa, that predatory hierarchies of many sorts
were no longer acceptable. "Human rights" and "social rights," so
long reserved primarily for the well-off and educated members of the
(largely white and male) "political class," now had to be extended
much more widely, although exactly how widely remained a matter of
bitter contention. 3 In the United States these trends found expression
49 Id. at 8.
50 Id. at 9.
51 Tunkl v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 449 (1963).
52 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was, of course, drafted by a
committee chaired by President Roosevelt's widow and formidable political presence
in her own right, Eleanor Roosevelt. Article 25(1) of the Declaration provides that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
For discussion of this Article and the movement for international human rights as it
relates to health care, see FARMER, supra note 7, at 213-46.
53 See generally ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 195-247
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in the African-American civil rights movement of the 1950s, 1960s
and beyond, the movements of other racial and ethnic groups, notably
Native Americans, and the legal services, welfare rights, women's
rights, disability rights, and gay rights movements of subsequent
years. Judicial opinions, statutes, regulations, and legal scholarship
using the social contract model in many areas were inspired by these
social movements, and several generations of lawyers and legal aca-
demics, myself included, were mobilized into the field of health law
through them.54
The legacy of the egalitarian social contract can be found in a
paradigm case from the United States Supreme Court which, though
not itself about health law, established the principle that the rule of
law applied to federal social welfare legislation generally, including
(as held in subsequent cases) medical assistance for the poor (Medi-
caid). 5  In Rosado v. Wyman, 56 a bipartisan six-justice majority
57
(1998) (exploring the impacts of the New Deal and World War II on American soci-
ety and the rights of individuals); J. M. ROBERTS, TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE HISTORY
OF THE WORLD, 1901 to 2000 554 (1999) (discussing how political and social ideas
were originally confined to their European origins but are currently spreading more
widely); cf ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD,
1914-1991 268-74 (1994) (linking the unprecedented economic growth of the ad-
vanced capitalist nations during the 30 years after World War I1 to the "restructuring
of capitalism" along more egalitarian and centrally directed lines).
54 Since Professor Max Mehlman invited the participants in this Symposium
to say something about their own path into health law, I will say that I took a course
with Professor Edward Sparer on Welfare Rights and a seminar with Professor Robert
Stevens on Medicaid in the late 1960s at the Yale Law School; worked with (later to
be) Professors Lee Albert and Sylvia Law on a Medicaid case at the Columbia Center
for Social Welfare Law in 1969, and became a staff attorney at the Health Law Pro-
ject of the University of Pennsylvania Law School (under the direction of Edward
Sparer and Sylvia Law) in 1972. 1 worked on the Project's "Health Law Materials"
that were used in a number of health law courses in the 1970s and served as the inspi-
ration for the casebook by Rand E. Rosenblatt, Sylvia A. Law & Sara Rosenbaum,
ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1. For an account of Ed Sparer's outstanding research
and advocacy in the field of health and social welfare law see Rand E. Rosenblatt,
Equality, Entitlement, and National Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed
Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105, 112-16 (1994).
55 See, e.g., Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding
that the Social Security Act protects Medicaid recipients from state modifications that
would reduce benefits without federal approval); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that the state could not cut Medicaid benefits without
showing that § 1902(d) has been met); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498
(1990) (holding that mandatory provisions of the Medicaid Act create rights enforce-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
56 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
17 Justice Harlan's opinion was joined by his fellow Republican Potter
Stewart, liberal Democrats William Douglas, William Brennan, and Thurgood Mar-
shall, and conservative Democrat Byron White. New Deal Democrat Hugo Black and
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opinion by then-considered conservative Justice John Marshall
Harlan, stood for three important principles. First, statutes dealing
with complex social policy issues (in Rosado, about cost-of-living
adjustments to welfare eligibility standards) should be interpreted if at
all possible as sources of meaningful law. Implicitly acknowledging
the tendency of the political branches of government to underenforce
and ignore legal provisions benefiting the poor and other politically
weak groups, Justice Harlan said that courts (and agencies) should
avoid reading statutes in ways that make them "a futile, hollow, and
indeed, a deceptive gesture" 58-laws that seem to promise something
for the poor, but "really" mean nothing more than formal assurances
and empty bureaucratic labels. Second, the statute may contemplate
not a clear rule or benefit, but a process of structured or bounded dis-
cretion, in which a federal or state agency is supposed to take certain
information and values into account. Such a "consideration rule"
gives rise to a right of the ultimate beneficiaries to have that consid-
eration take place.59 Third, statutes such as these, even when framed
as conditions on federal funding to the states, can be treated as indi-
vidual (and, through class actions, group) rights, enforceable in court
directly against the relevant state decisionmakers. Congress' delega-
tion to a federal agency of authority to define and enforce these statu-
tory conditions did not preclude direct judicial action against the
states, unless Congress had clearly indicated such preclusion. This
was particularly true where neither Congress nor the agency had given
beneficiaries access to the administrative process or effective adminis-
trative remedies. "We are most reluctant," wrote Justice Harlan, "to
assume that Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial re-
view to those individuals most directly affected by the administration
of its program. 6°
Republican Warren Burger dissented. There were eight justices on the Supreme
Court at that moment rather than the usual nine.
58 Rosado, 397 U.S. at 415.
59 Rosado can be viewed formally or technically as not being about struc-
tured discretion, because the Court interpreted the particular federal statutory provi-
sion at issue as requiring the state to adjust its "standards of need" (dollar amounts for
different-sized families below which the family is said to be "in need"), leaving the
state no, or virtually no, discretion as to that matter. However, the opinion placed
this provision in a broader context: the state still had discretion to set actual grant
levels at a lower dollar amount than the standards of need, and the statutory require-
ment of updating the standards was understood as forcing the state to engage in a
candid process of acknowledging how much below its own standards it had decided
to pay. Id. at 413-14.
60 Id. at 420 (finding that state welfare provisions are judicially reviewable).
For additional discussion of the Rosado principles, their incorporation into social
welfare and health law, and the attack on them by Chief Justice Rehnquist and his
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The social contract model speaks to most areas of health care de-
livery, ranging from financing and access to the meaning of quality
and the nature of the physician-patient relationship. It does not pro-
vide formulas or easy answers; on the contrary, it asserts that these are
matters of social and political choice broadly understood, informed by
expertise and values relevant to health care delivery, but not to be
resolved solely by the purportedly simple (but actually quite con-
tested) metrics of "medical expertise" or "efficiency." In particular,
the social contract model tends to see health insurance as social insur-
ance, i.e. as a means of meeting the basic human need for health care
colleagues, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Recon-
struction ofAmerican Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439 (1993).
Activist conservative advocates and judges have continued to attack the Rosado prin-
ciples aggressively, notably in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 289 F. 3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1045
(2002). The district judge in Westside Mothers invited a private organization to make
the arguments against beneficiary enforcement of the federal Medicaid statute when
the state failed to pursue them with what he viewed as sufficient vigor. Id. at 552.
For a review and critique of the Westside Mothers decision, see Sylvia A. Law, Wil-
liam Howard Taft Lecture, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault
on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 392-95 (2002). As the Sixth
Circuit summarized:
In a detailed and far-reaching opinion, the district court held that Medicaid
was only a contract between a state and the federal government, that spend-
ing-power programs such as Medicaid were not supreme law of the land,
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Michigan was the
"real defendant and therefore possess[ed] sovereign immunity against suit,"
[133 F.Supp.2d at 553] that in this case Exparte Young was unavailable to
circumvent the state's sovereign immunity, and that even if it were available
§ 1983 does not create a cause of action available to plaintiffs to enforce
the provisions in question.
289 F.3d at 857. The Sixth Circuit "reverse[d] on all issues presented," reasoning that
"[b]inding precedent has put the issue to rest. The Supreme Court has held that the
conditions imposed by the federal government pursuant to statute upon states partici-
pating in Medicaid and similar programs are not merely contract provisions; they are
federal laws." Id. at 857 - 858 (citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656,
669 (1985)). The Supreme Court denied certiorari without dissent, 537 U.S. 1045
(2002). Nevertheless, President Bush nominated Jeffrey Sutton, Esq., the private
attorney who made the radical anti-enforceability arguments that prevailed in the
district court, to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Senate confirmed his
appointment. See Neil A. Lewis, Senate Approves a Nominee; Filibuster is set for
Another, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at A22. See also M.A.C. v. Betit, No.
2:02CV 1395, 2003 WL 22119134, at *6 (D. Utah, Aug. 26, 2003) (holding particular
provisions of federal Medicaid statute unenforceable by private beneficiaries because
neither the general authorizing language of the Medicaid Act nor the specific provi-
sions relied on by the plaintiffs "contain rights-creating language unequivocally con-
ferring an individual fight to support a cause of action under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]," as
required by Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)). The statute at issue in
Rosado also contained no explicit rights-creating language.
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with funds derived from the society or some large sub-group within it.
The financial burden of health care is inevitably distributed unevenly,
with sick or injured people facing far more costs than others.6' In the
social contract view, the goal of health insurance is to spread these
costs as broadly as possible, so as to lower the per capita financial
impact, reduce administrative expenses (no need for risk selection),
and provide as many people as possible with reasonably-priced access
to health insurance and health services against the largely random
risks of illness and injury. To achieve this kind of universalism, or
what Deborah Stone calls the "logic of solidarity" and mutual aid,62
payments into the system (through taxes, premiums, and patient out-
of-pocket cost-sharing) have to be generally equal and affordable (and
thus subsidized for lower-income enrollees), and benefits have to be
as far as possible available to all on the basis of medical need, with
minimal influence of "ability to pay, past consumption of medical
care, or expected future consumption.
'
"
63
Like the professional authority model before it, the social contract
model, as it emerged in American health law and policy, was unable
to solve three major and related problems. First, because of the con-
siderable political power of the hospital industry and organized medi-
cine, the major federal health insurance programs enacted in 1965-
Medicare and Medicaid-had to acquiesce to hospital control of
prices through payment of dramatically misnamed "reasonable costs,"
and (for Medicare) physician control of prices through fee-for-service
payment for "reasonable," "customary," or "prevailing" charges.
64
These mechanisms, which were substantially in place until the early
1980s, the absence of a strong constituency for restraint; and the high
political costs of "control[ling] the incomes of all those with interests
in the health care industry," 65 made it impossible for the social con-
tract model to constrain very rapid increases in prices and overall
health expenditures. Second, as medical and pharmaceutical technol-
61 See JOST, supra note 3, at 8-9 ("[T]he 1% of the population that spends the
most on health care is responsible for 27% of health care costs, and ... the top 10% []
for nearly 70%." On the other hand, "the least expensive 50% of the population ac-
counts for only 3% of health care expenditures").
62 Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287, 290 (1993) (discussing whether solidarity principle or
actuarial logic should govern health insurance).
63 Id. at 292.
64 See, e.g., STARR supra note 6 at 374-78 (regarding the power of hospitals
to initially wield considerable control over prices and payment); THEODORE MARMOR,
THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 85-86 (1973) (illustrating how the methods and costs of
paying physicians and hospitals were the most serious problems under Medicare).
65 STARR, supra note 6, at 412.
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ogy continued its explosive development, many began to believe that
there needed to be some way to regulate or restrain use of the most
expensive (and often experimental or at least not clearly proven bene-
ficial) modalities. But the increasingly entrepreneurial and income-
driven culture of doctors and hospitals precluded low-visibility ration-
ing, and the framers of the social contract (political leaders and to a
lesser extent, judges) could find no acceptable political or legal basis
for rationing. 66 Third, political leaders working with the social con-
tract model were unable to devise a method of redistribution that
would fund universal access and be politically acceptable to those
who already had private health insurance-much of the middle class
(including unionized blue-collar sectors) and more affluent socio-
economic groups. Instead, programs such as Medicare and Medicaid
had to rely primarily on relatively regressive tax bases-the federal
payroll tax and out-of-pocket cost-sharing for Medicare, and (for the
non-federal share) state sales and income taxes for Medicaid. These
limitations guaranteed various inadequacies in coverage and provider
payment in both programs, as well as over forty million people with-
out health insurance. President Clinton attempted to solve these prob-
lems with a national health insurance proposal that ingeniously com-
bined the social contract, market competition, and professional author-
ity models, but was unable to mobilize the political support needed to
overcome intense opposition.67
C. The Market Competition Model
Advocates of market competition rose to prominence in the 1970s
by launching two major attacks on the previously dominant profes-
sional authority and social contract models. First, they argued that
both the scientific justification for professional authority and the pub-
66 For examples and discussion ofjudicial and political reaction to insurers'
efforts to deny payment for expensive care of an arguably debatable benefit-high
dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplants for various stages of
breast cancer-see ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 224-37, 251-61 and
ROSENBLATT FT AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 196-213 (2001
& 2001-02 Supp.).
67 Among many other reasons, the Clinton plan was seen as having failed, in
part, because its policy synthesis was too complex, untried, and understandably reti-
cent about its cost containment features, and because too much energy was spent on
policy analysis and design and too little on political "communication and persuasion."
JACOB HACKER, THE ROAD To NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY 179 (1997). See also THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG:
CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S.
POLITICS (1996) (analyzing the failure of the Health Security effort and the tremen-
dous political opposition President Clinton could not overcome).
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lic interest justification for the social contract were largely illusory,
particularly as expressed in actual American health care policy. Most
health care services were not matters of immediate life-and-death, nor
scientifically validated as "necessary," but rather were matters of
comfort and convenience, and should be properly treated as discre-
tionary consumption.68 The asserted logic of solidarity or mutual aid
largely functioned as a cover for self-interested and powerful groups
to grab a monopolistic (in the case of doctors and hospitals) or other-
wise unfair share of common resources. Hence, the profound inequity
of tax-subsidized employment-based health insurance, which allows
the upper-middle class to avoid paying taxes on lavish employer-
provided health insurance policies, while providing no benefit to low-
wage workers whose employers offer no health insurance at all, and,
according to Professor Clark Havighurst, much less benefit to lower-
income insured workers who often lack the upper-middle class's so-
cial connections with elite doctors and aggressive sense of entitle-
ment.69 Second, the market advocates argued, in the classic fashion of
all conservative arguments against equality and mutual aid,7° that the
egalitarian social contract model led to perverse and dysfunctional
results, notably unrestrained cost increases and misallocation of re-
sources. By severing the demand for health services from the individ-
ual's obligation to pay, tax subsidies and social insurance (including
its private American version, community-rated Blue Cross/Blue
Shield) supported consumption of decreasingly beneficial services,
while denying desperately needed care to those with inadequate eco-
nomic and political power to secure the benefits of politically-
structured solidarity.
More generally, the market advocates denied that government
regulation could provide any solution to the problems of equity and
68 See Charles Fried, Health Care, Cost Containment, Liberty, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 527, 527-29 (John Arras & Robert Hunt eds., 1983);
Clark C. Havighurst & James Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in
Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 12 (1975).. Support for this
view was said to come from the small area "geographic variation" studies by Dr. John
Wennberg and others, who showed that widely varying geographical rates in surgical
procedures and hospitalization could not be explained by demographic factors such as
age or incidence of illness. Therefore, the argument went, these procedures were less
an objective necessity than a "choice" shaped by medical fashion and/or patients' own
culturally-influenced expectations. See, e.g., ENTHOVEN, supra note 3, at 46.
69 See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 86-87, 92-94 (discussing the basis of the
inequities of our present health care system).
70 See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION:
PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991) (discussing the perversity, futility, and
jeopardy theses, which are typically used by conservatives to attack liberal egalitarian
policies).
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cost containment. Governmental or (as in the case of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield) private nonprofit financing and regulatory programs are noto-
riously subject to "capture" by powerful and well-organized interests
(in this context, doctors and hospitals), 7' as the history of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, Hill-Burton, Medicare, and Medicaid seemed to
confirm. Moreover, governmental agencies lack the technical skills
and political authority to influence the powerful forces of economic
self-interest that operate in the health care industry as they do any-
where else.72 The market advocates proposed to solve two of the three
problems that bedeviled the social contract model: cost containment
and rationing. Both would be accomplished in the only way that, in
this view, was politically acceptable to most Americans as well as
pragmatically feasible: the market, which constrains costs through the
pressures of competition and rations through the magic of "voluntary"
consumer choice in response to price signals. 73 The third problem-
universal access or health insurance-admittedly could not be solved
through purely market means, because some redistributive mechanism
had to be built in to subsidize access for low-income people. Even
here, though, market advocates claimed that a dominant market prin-
ciple would help. Once the market had achieved cost containment and
rationing for most of the population, the redistributive task would be
smaller and less politically controversial.
As with the earlier emergence of the social contract model, the
political and intellectual rise of the market competition model was due
to factors both internal and external to health care delivery. The in-
ability of the social contract model to restrain annual double-digit
increases in health care spending, epitomized by the Carter Admini-
stration's proposal of and failure to enact hospital price controls,
strongly reinforced in the health care context a broader deregulatory
movement among economists, other policy experts, and politicians
away from "command and control" approaches and in favor of market
mechanisms. 74 The pro-market, anti-government phenomenon, like
71 See ENTHOVEN, supra note 3, at 111.
72 See id. at 102-03, 111-13.
71 Id. at 111-13.
74 See, STARR, supra note 6, at 412-13; ENTHOVEN, supra note 3, at 97-101.
See also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 98 (1995) [hereinafter
HEALTH CARE CHOICES] (discussing how federal policy concerning health care
changed in the late 1970's); cf ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE
VIRTUES AND LIMITS OFMARKETS 34-37 (1996). Detailed accounts of the rise of the
market competition perspective can be found in Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit,
Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 2002, at 11, 11-36 and James C. Robinson, The Politics of Managed Compe-
tition: Public Abuse of the Private Interest, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 341, 341-
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the social contract model before it, was also connected to larger and
deeper forces. Such phenomena as suburbanization, the decline of
manufacturing and organized labor, the reaction of many Americans
against the movements for African-American civil rights, feminism,
and gay rights, the Watergate crisis, the cultural ferment of the 1960s
and 1970s, and the deregulation of international finance and trade
formed a complex brew in which a new conservative political coali-
tion would arise that linked, more effectively than ever before, laissez-
faire capitalism and social traditionalism (including religious funda-
mentalism and significant support for hierarchies of race, gender, and
sexual orientation). 7
An idea critical to the market model is that the individual health
care consumer experiences the true costs of her or his choices. Where
the social insurance model wants to separate the consumption of
health care as much as possible from the individual's ability to pay,
and regards linking the two as largely irrational, the market competi-
tion model wants to intensify the connection. Thus two prominent
law professor advocates of the market competition model, Clark
Havighurst and James Blumstein, state that the appropriate test for
evaluating a health care financing system's performance is whether "it
give[s] reasonable individuals what they want and only what they
want, in the sense that, understanding the alternatives, they would
purchase it for themselves assuming their income is not below a cer-
tain level, perhaps the median in the population.
7 6
The problem, according to the market advocates, is that the failure
to tax employment-based health insurance or deduct its cost from em-
ployees' wages gives employees the false impression that both the
insurance and health services are "free," thereby leading to inefficient
overconsumption of health insurance and health care services. In
terms of Havighurst's and Blumstein's criterion above, this overcon-
sumption means that millions of Americans are receiving more health
insurance and more health care services than they "really want," be-
cause what they "really want" can only be determined by how they
46 (2003).
75 See, e.g., THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION:
THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (arguing
that the Republican party gained support during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury by utilizing the issues of race and taxes); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW
POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 73 passim (1984) (explaining how and why various adversar-
ial and generally conservative groups came together to support the Republican Party
in the 1970's and how that convergence created a shift in the balance of power in
American politics).
76 Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 63, at 15-16 (emphasis in the origi-
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would spend their money if they had to buy health insurance and
health services with their own after-tax dollars. The goal of market
reform is to reduce or eliminate the current tax exclusion of health
insurance, and thereby drive middle-income people's insurance down
to the level where it should properly be-at the level they will choose
when they pay for it with their own after-tax dollars. They would then
experience individual responsibility for, and freedom of, their
choices.7 7 Of course, better-off people would be free to buy better
insurance and services.
Having (by hypothesis) created millions of cost-conscious con-
sumers searching for the best health insurance "deal," what kind of
competition among insurers should be encouraged or required by law
and policy? Interestingly, two of the most prominent academic mar-
ket advocates-Alain Enthoven and Havighurst-reject what Entho-
ven calls "a completely free market" in favor of "rules to channel the
competition along socially desirable lines, 78 widely known as "man-
aged competition." Although Enthoven and Havighurst appear to
differ somewhat on the relative roles of government and private enti-
ties, they both endorse standardized health insurance policies with a
few tiers of benefits and co-payments, so that consumers can easily
compare options and prices. 79  Enthoven would have government
mandate open enrollment and community rating, so as to "require all
insurers (or at least all those whose policies are eligible for tax subsi-
dies) to accept the bad risks (those who need insurance the most)
along with the good risks and to charge them the same premium."
80
Under Havighurst's approach, a "sponsor" of managed competi-
tion (e.g. a large employer, coalition of smaller employers, "purchas-
ing cooperative," or governmentally-designated entity) would "make"
or regulate the market of competing "health plans" through similar
rules and policies, including risk-adjusted payments reflecting the
"risk profiles of the populations attracted by each plan" (thereby forc-
77 See Fried, supra note 63, at 529-30 (discussing why individuals should
determine what level of health care they need and why each should be responsible for
its cost). For a critique of this vision of freedom, see Privatizing Health Care, supra
note 12, at 10, passim (arguing that the market conception of human freedom is inco-
herent, because it reduces normative human choice to the "freedom" to obey or com-
ply with the "natural" or "empirical" dictates of markets).
78 ENTHOVEN, supra note 3, at 78. See also Clark C. Havighurst, Controlling
Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, 1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 471, 490-91 (1976-1977) (arguing in favor of a "market oriented" health care
system which would take into account social justice concerns).
79 ENTHOVEN, supra note 3 at 127-29; HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 69,
at 26.
80 ENTHOVEN, supra note 3 at 80.
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ing the better health risks to subsidize the so-called bad risks) and
discretionary power to exclude plans from the market that fall short of
"reasonable" contract terms and "style of care.",81 By deterring com-
petition to enroll healthier patients, both versions hope to force price
competition to reflect true quality and efficiency, including
"cost/quality trade-offs." Havighurst particularly emphasizes new
kinds of contracts between health plans (insurers or integrated insurer-
providers) and their enrollees and providers, in which plans would
"overtly differentiate themselves from one another in the nature and
content of the services they provide." 82 Havighurst's strategy is to
allow plans to offer, and moderate or low income consumers to pur-
chase, something less than "first-class, state-of-the-art, American style
medical care," which he refers to as a "health care Cadillac. 83 The
exact nature of these lesser quality, more risky insurance contracts and
medical "practice style[s] '84 is not, in my view, entirely clear. At
times Havighurst suggests that they would authorize "small compro-
mises on content and quality" or "slightly greater risks., 85 He also
states that "[a] crucial assumption ... is that government will provide,
either directly or through the tax system, adequate public support of
individuals' purchasing power, so that consumers are not forced to
,,86carry their economizing to socially objectionable extremes. At
other times Havighurst appears to characterize the lower cost options
in terms of "vital basic services," "bare-bones coverage," "aggressive
economizing," and "only the most essential needs." 87 In any event,
under his proposed approach to health law Havighurst wants moderate
and low-income consumers to have the option to waive many or most
81 HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 69, at 36-38.
82 Id. at 137.
83 Id. at 104.
84 Id. at 136.
8 Id. at 104.
86 Id. at 25-26. Enthoven states, "we are not willing to leave the distribution
of medical purchasing power to the market and other forces that determine income
distribution," and therefore the government should assist "the poor" through a system
of income-related premium subsidies "that are large enough to enable them to pur-
chase ... a good-quality comprehensive health care plan" including "choice" among
available plans. ENTHOVEN, supra note 3 at 81. Given that "the typical family policy
for all types of health plans averaged $9,068 a year in the spring of 2003," Tony
Pugh, Health-Plan Premiums Spike 14 pct. in One Year, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 10,
2003, at CI, and that median family income was $42,409 in 2002, Lynette Clemetson,
More Americans in Poverty in 2002, Census Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.27, 2003,
at A 10, it appears that subsidies would have to extend beyond "the poor" in 2003.
87 HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 69, at 104, 105, 138, 140. How these
terms can be seen as consistent with a standardized benefits package is also not self
evident.
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of their legal rights under tort and contract law, as a way of further
lowering the plan's price and freeing providers to engage in econo-
mizing practice styles.88
The market competition model has played out rather differently in
the real world of health law and policy. One of the key components
of Enthoven's and Havighurst's vision-the deterrence of preferred
risk selection and channeling of price competition into some version
of quality and efficiency-was not enacted into law and has otherwise
largely failed to take place. On the contrary, from the perspective of
the for-profit health insurance industry, risk selection, medical under-
writing, and experience rating are the essence of a properly function-
ing market. 89 Health insurance is not seen as a social mechanism for
paying for the health care needs of a population. Rather, insurance is
seen as a transaction between two economically "rational" actors-an
individual (or group of aggregated individuals) and an insurance com-
pany. Each of these actors is trying to achieve maximum economic
utility. The individual (or group) wants the lowest possible price for
the desired insurance coverage. The insurance company wants the
maximum profit. The logic of this perspective leads to market frag-
mentation, the exact opposite of the universalism and solidarity of
social insurance. In the market, individuals want to associate them-
selves with the lowest possible risk group, and exclude people with
serious illnesses or other high cost characteristics. Insurance compa-
nies want to segregate risk pools as much as possible-the industry
term is "actuarial fairness"-so as to charge low competitive prices to
healthy groups and high, actuarially appropriate premiums to people
with high cost characteristics.9"
" Id. at 266, 303-19.
89 See generally Stone, supra note 57 (discussing conflicting distributive
justice theories affecting American health politics); see also Deborah Stone, The
Rhetoric of Insurance Law: The Debate Over AIDS Testing, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
385, 388-91 (1990) [hereinafter Rhetoric ofInsurance Law] (analyzing the effect of
using HIV/AIDS diagnostic testing in insurance underwriting).
90 Stone, supra note 57, at 290. For arguments in favor of risk rating, see
Rhetoric ofInsurance Law, supra note 84, at 392-93 (explaining the view that insur-
ers have a "positive duty" to separate identifiable risk groups, otherwise the healthy
will end up subsidizing the unhealthy); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Wel-
fare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 942, 963-64 (1963) (justifying
the use of risk rating by explaining why pooling unequal risks is problematic). For
arguments against risk rating, see David M. Frankford, Neoclassical Health Econom-
ics and the Debate Over National Health Insurance: The Power ofAbstraction, 18
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 351, 365-71 (1993) (hereinafter Neoclassical Health Econom-
ics]); Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74
B.U. L. REV. 109, 110-20 (1994) (arguing that the use of market pricing and risk
rating undermine the ability of insurance to provide community coverage for all peo-
ple). See also, Mark V. Pauly, Risk Variation and Fallback Insurers in Universal
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A paradigm case for the market competition model of this sort is
McGann v. H. & H. Music Co.9 1 John McGann, an employee of H &
H Music, discovered that he was afflicted with AIDS in December
1987 and soon submitted his first claims for reimbursement under the
company's group health insurance policy, which provided for lifetime
benefits up to one million dollars. In July 1988, the company in-
formed its employees that it was not renewing its group health insur-
ance policy, and that its new self-insured health plan included a five
thousand dollar lifetime cap on benefits payable for AIDS-related (but
no other) illnesses.92 McGann sued H & H Music under section 510
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),9 3 arguing
that the five thousand dollar AIDS cap was directed specifically at
him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the company's then-
existing plan, and that to prohibit such actions by employers, the pre-
viously-existing health plan should be interpreted as containing an
implied promise not to "deselect" a known employee from the insur-
ance pool.
To understand this argument, imagine that before McGann ac-
cepted a job with H & H Music, he had asked about the health bene-
fits. Assume that the company spokesperson had replied: "You will
have one million dollars in lifetime health coverage, except if you
develop an unusual and expensive condition we may re-design the
plan to limit severely your benefits for that condition." McGann and
many other prospective employees might have refused such job condi-
tions, and the company's failure to make this clear may have helped
induce McGann to accept these conditions unknowingly.
The company conceded that the benefit reduction was prompted
by knowledge of McGann's illness and that McGann was the only
covered person then known to have AIDS, but the district court ruled
for the company on the grounds that the employer had an absolute
right to alter the terms of the plan regardless of its intent in making the
alterations.94 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that while ERISA
Coverage Insurance Plans, 29 INQUIRY: J. HEALTH CARE ORG. PROVISION & FIN. 137
(1992) (arguing that fallback insurers should be utilized as a compromise between
complete risk rating and the prohibition against risk rating).
91 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
92 Other changed characteristics of the new plan included "increased individ-
ual and family deductibles, elimination of coverage for chemical dependency treat-
ment, adoption of a preferred provider plan and increased contribution requirements."
Id. at 403 n. 1.
"3 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against a
participant or beneficiary who exercises any right she is entitled to under an employee
benefit plan).
94 McGann, 946 F.2d at 403-04.
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protected beneficiaries' rights under a plan, once an employer had
changed a plan in a procedurally correct manner, employees no longer
had any rights other than those specified in the new plan.95 Quoting a
Sixth Circuit opinion, the McGann court explicitly stated that ERISA
embodied the model of market competition, in that "courts have no
authority to decide which benefits employers must confer upon their
employees; these are decisions which are more appropriately influ-
enced by forces in the marketplace and, when appropriate, by [other]
federal legislation., 96 In the wake of the McGann decision, the New
York Times reported that many union and small employer health plans
and at least one state high-risk insurance pool had adopted similar
limitations on AIDS-related treatment.
97
95 See id. at 405. By dropping its insurance policy and establishing a self-
insured plan, H & H Music insulated itself (under ERISA's "deemer clause") from
any state law requiring coverage or prohibiting discrimination in benefits. See 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) (commonly known as the "deemer clause").
96 Id. at 407 (quoting Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Ret. Program for Sala-
ried Employees, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984)). Arguing (successfully) against
Supreme Court review, the Solicitor General stated that while ERISA did not regulate
employers' design of plan benefits, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§12101 et seq. (enacted in 1990 and hence not applicable to the events in
McGann) could resolve the problem. See Robert Pear, U.S. to Argue Employers Can
Cut Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at A 18. While the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission indeed interpreted the ADA as prohibiting disease-
specific caps in most circumstances, see 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 109 d22 (June
19, 1993), the federal courts have rejected this view. See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 302(a) of the ADA does
not prohibit disease specific caps, but rather, this practice is regulated by state law).
Under Enthoven's approach, a policy with a disease-specific benefits cap would pre-
sumably not be eligible for federal funding through individuals' tax credits unless the
government-defined standard policy permitted it. See ENTHOVEN, supra note 3, at
121-23. Havighurst states that plans may use disease-specific "practice guidelines"
but should combine them "with other contractual strategies to implement a consistent
plan policy throughout all the gray areas of medical practice." HEALTH CARE
CHOICES, supra note 69, at 241. The reason plans should not use practice guidelines
"to curb the use of a few costly treatments" is to prevent consumers from shopping
for plans that might be generous for their particular (uncurbed) conditions. See id.
Under Havighurst's approach, if expensive treatments for AIDS were not cost justi-
fied in terms of their health benefits at the time McGann was making claims (the late
1980s), the plan would have been justified in refusing to pay for them, ideally under
appropriate general contractual language. On the other hand, a plan that capped pay-
ment for all AIDS-related costs, including humane, palliative care, might be refused
entry into the managed care market by a reasonable plan sponsor. See id. at 38.
97 Milt Freudenheim, Patients Cite Bias in AIDS Coverage by Health Plans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1993, at Al. See also Stone, supra note 57, at 300-08 (reporting
widespread de facto medical underwriting even for relatively large groups); Rhetoric
of Insurance Law, supra note 84, at 390 n.7 (reporting that according to a 1988 Office
of Technology Assessment survey of insurance underwriting practices, Medical Test-
ing and Health Insurance, Doc. No. OTA-H-384, at 80, 85, "[s]eventy-seven of the
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A second paradigm case of the market competition model is Cor-
coran v. United Health Care.98  In this case, a physician recom-
mended that a woman be hospitalized for the final weeks of her high-
risk pregnancy, but a utilization review subcontractor (United Health
Care) of the employer's self-insured health plan refused payment ap-
proval, and authorized part-time at-home nursing care instead.
This appears to be the kind of health insurer cost-benefit discre-
tion that Havighurst has in mind. Hospitalization is obviously a very
expensive way to control for the risk of fetal distress. If there were no
scientific cost-benefit studies validating hospitalization over less ex-
pensive part-time at-home nursing, the insurer should have the author-
ity to pay only for the less expensive care so as to keep premium costs
within the employees' collective budget. The fact that while the pa-
tient was at home and not attended by the nurse the fetus went into
distress and died is simply the incidental and voluntarily chosen result
of the family's limited resources, the legitimacy of which is not (by
hypothesis) challenged. It would be equivalent to someone dying in
an automobile accident "because" they were driving a lightweight,
low-cost automobile, which was all they could afford. As long as the
automobile had passed the standards of state safety inspection, no one
could complain that their legal rights had been violated because oth-
ers, with more money, could afford heavier and safer vehicles.
99
To be sure, Havighurst strongly advocates contractual candor
about the health plan's authority to make such decisions, so as to
make higher risk contracts legally enforceable (as they indeed turned
out to be in Corcoran even with debatable candor) and politically
legitimate.'00 Much to Havighurst's frustration, insurers seem to re-
gard this as advice to commit marketing, liability, and provider-
relations suicide.' 0' Moreover, many moderate or lower-income peo-
commercial small-group insurers, 58% of the commercial large-group insurers, 77%
of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield small-group plans, and 7% of the Blue Cross-Blue
Shield large-group plans either screened or planned to screen for high-risk appli-
cants"). But see Havighurst, supra note 2, at 69 n.50 (citing MARK A. HALL,
REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 57 (1994), and FAMILIES USA, No SALE:
THE FAILURE OF BAREBONES INSURANCE (1993) for the contrary proposition, that
"very few employers opted, when it was offered, for health insurance without certain
state-mandated benefits and with arbitrary dollar or other caps on coverage").
9' 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
99 See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malprac-
tice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1991) (arguing that lower standards of
medical care for the poor are no more problematic than the safety differences between
a Volvo and a Volkswagen).
100 Havighurst, supra note 2, at 96-100.
101 Id. at 100. Havighurst also criticizes the managed care industry for not
having been candid with consumers and for not having educated them during the
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pie do not seem to accept riskier health care with the same grace that
they appear to accept riskier automobiles. 0 2 The Corcorans' state law
suit for damages claimed that United had been negligent in perform-
ing its role, which raised important questions about the nature of
United's duty of care to patients, the applicable standard of care, and
the qualifications of and procedures and criteria used by the personnel
who denied authorization for the hospital stay.
The Fifth Circuit framed the key legal issue as whether United
was making "medical decisions" about the care to be provided a par-
ticular patient or "benefit determinations" about what the plan would
pay for.10 3 Plan publications stressed both functions, and repeatedly
stated that utilization review was based on "nationally accepted medi-
cal guidelines" and was "independent, professional review" that
works "together with your doctor... to assure that you and your fam-
ily receive the most appropriate medical care." °" 4 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that while United did make medical decisions, it did so "in-
cident to benefit determinations," and therefore ERISA preempted any
state-law damage action against it. 105 To allow such actions would
impose costs varying among states on health plans using utilization
review to achieve cost containment, thereby "decreasing the pool of
funds available to reimburse participants" and contravening Congress'
purported judgment that state law not "interfere" with ERISA's "care-
fully constructed scheme of federal regulation."' 0 6  The Corcoran
court acknowledged that ERISA itself does not provide for any dam-
more politically favorable 1980s when cost savings were also much easier to achieve.
Id. at 74-77.
102 Havighurst sees consumers' false consciousness on this point as based on
their continued insulation from the actual costs of their care, and hence neither their
economic nor political choices "reveal their true preferences." Id. at 78.
102 Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329-31.
103 Id. at 1323-24.
104 id.
105 965 F.2d at 1331.
106 Id. at 1333. The argument that tort damages for seriously injured patients
must be precluded so as to preserve the limited pool of available funds was previously
used to bar charitable patients from recovery under the doctrine of charitable immu-
nity for hospitals. For reasons why this doctrine was abandoned, see President and
Dir. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 822-23, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(debunking torts-based arguments for maintaining a system of charitable immunity).
For reasons why ERISA's express preemption provision, ERISA § 514, should not be
regarded as "carefully constructed," see, e.g., Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra
note 1, at 173-177 (discussing legislative history and last-minute expansion of
§ 514). For reasons why ERISA's remedies provisions, notably ERISA § 502, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, are widely regarded as conceptually erroneous and
a policy disaster, see, for example., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting in part).
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ages for "medical malpractice committed in connection with a plan
benefit determination," 10 7 and that therefore "the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mis-
take."' 08 The court found this "troubling for several reasons," notably
that it eliminated a financial incentive for ERISA plans "to seek out
the companies that can deliver both high quality services and reason-
able prices,"' 09 thereby implicitly encouraging health plans to use
utilization reviewers who were dangerously committed to denying
care. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit held that this is what the ERISA
law meant, and that any needed changes were up to Congress to
make. 10 Congress has not acted as of October 2003, eleven years
after the Corcoran opinion. In the meantime, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts began to interpret ERISA to allow some state law
litigation based on the social contract model to mitigate the unre-
strained market."
Corcoran and its political aftermath highlight a split between real
world market-based health law and policy and at least some of the
market model's academic advocates. For example, Havighurst be-
lieves that managed care entities should be legally accountable, be-
cause that would help make their rationing policies and decisions po-
litically and legally legitimate and acceptable to the public. 1 2 For
these reasons, his version of the market model appears to be critical of
Congress' inaction in the wake of cases such as Corcoran.' 3 On the
107 Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333
'o' Id. at 1338.
109 Id. at 1338.
110 Id. at 1338-39.
Without explicitly so holding, the Supreme Court cast considerable doubt
on Corcoran's continued viability in its opinion in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
229, 231 (2000) (holding that "to the extent" that "an HMO" makes "mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions" - i.e. whether a particular treatment is medically necessary
for an individual patient - "through its physicians," it is not to be treated as a fiduci-
ary under ERISA). For the Fifth Circuit's own view that Pegram and other Supreme
Court decisions cast doubt on Corcoran, see Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298,
313-15 (5th Cir. 2002). Although the Fifth Circuit panel that decided Roark consid-
ered itself bound by the now dubiously correct Corcoran in one of the four cases
consolidated in Roark, id. at 315, the same panel followed its view of Pegram in two
of the other consolidated cases and held that ERISA § 502 did not support removal
(also known as "complete preemption," id at 305) of state law liability claims against
managed care entities, id. at 305-311. The Supreme granted certiorari on this ruling
on November 3, 2003, sub noma. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 462 (2003)
and Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc. v. Calad, 124 S.Ct. 463 (2003). By way of dis-
closure, I am a co-author of an amicus brief to the Supreme Court urging affirmance
of the Fifth Circuit's ruling regarding ERISA § 502.
112 See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 75-77, 98-99.
"'3 Id. at 98-99. Havighurst notes that:
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other hand, Havighurst is clear that the new law of managed care li-
ability should not rest on what he sees as the self-interested and scien-
tifically unvalidated "professional standard" of care, and he hopes that
properly drafted and disclosed economizing contracts will get a more
supportive reception from the courts than has been traditionally ac-
corded insurance contracts.' 14 Under his proposal, there would be a
new law of managed care liability that would draw the line between
appropriate and inappropriate market-based rationing based on the
values of the rationing or market phenomenon itself. Under this re-
gime (assuming ERISA had been appropriately amended or reinter-
preted) there could have been a trial on the merits in Corcoran, but the
plaintiffs might well still lose, because the standard of care would
have been reduced by the health insurance contract as interpreted in
the light of the values of market competition.
Like the other two models, the market competition model has
been able to address some problems better than others. Its managed
care dimension is widely credited with restraining increases in health
care costs during much of the 1990s. Whether this can be accurately
attributed to "market competition" is debatable; certainly the vision of
numerous insurer-provider entities supplying consumers with elabo-
rate information and cost-effective choices has not come to pass.
What did happen was a shift in bargaining power, with physicians and
hospitals losing power to relatively concentrated insurer-managed
care entities who aggregated large numbers of "covered lives" and
were, therefore, able to drive hard bargains over price and (to a less
clear extent) utilization controls." 5 But while this version of market
[P]rofit-oriented health plans were allowed to become responsible de facto
for controlling the cost of care while remaining generally immune from any
legal responsibility for its quality. This situation [created by cases such as
Corcoran], which is now being ameliorated by curbing plans' ability to
control costs, was so illogical as to induce wonder how the political/legal
system ever allowed it to develop. In any event, it is within the power of
individual health plans to assume such liability voluntarily, thereby perhaps
re-legitimizing their efforts to resist the effects of moral hazard.
Id. While this is a perfectly logical proposal, one can imagine most, perhaps all man-
aged care plans being reluctant to accept it.
114 Id. at 72-74 (tort law); Havighurst, supra note 69, at 271-302 (modifying
by contract tort liability rules and remedies); id. at 303-28 (contract interpretation and
remedies).
115 See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 58-64 (seeing the gains of the market-
based "health care revolution" as antitrust enforcement, some (but not nearly enough)
de-legitimizing of medical professional patterns of clinical practice through variations
research, extracting competitive price discounts, pre-determination of coverage, and,
of ambiguous value, passing some financial risk to providers). See also Agrawal &
Veit, supra note 69, at 41-42 (stating that managed care slowed health care spending,
particularly from 1993 to 1998 (but not thereafter), reduced hospital lengths of stay,
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competition was able to implement some forms of cost containment
and rationing, it was not able to convince the American people that
these steps were legitimate. This was partly because the process was
fragmented among numerous companies, often poorly administered
and explained, and largely secret. In addition, the adamant refusal of
managed care entities to subject themselves to legal accountability,
while victorious in cases such as Corcoran, was disastrous from a
political/public relations point of view, with audiences cheering nega-
tive portrayal of HMOs in popular movies such as the 1997 film As
Good As It Gets.' 16 Moreover, the most powerful argument for ration-
ing-that it transfers resources from low-value (or even wasteful) to
higher-value health care interventions 17- --could not be credibly made,
because American law imposed no restraints on how the funds saved
by rationing should be used, a phenomenon made clear by the high
incomes paid to the leaders of the newly entrepreneurial health care
"industry."' 18
In many respects, the academic versions of the market competi-
tion model have not been realized." 9 In addition to the many reasons
encouraged more outpatient procedures, and held down payments to providers).
116 See Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care:
Hard Politics Make BadPolicy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 395 (2001) (noting positive
audience response to "an anti-HMO expletive"); Pendo, supra note 3 (noting audience
response to As Good As It Gets and extensively analyzing the films Critical Care, The
Rainmaker, and John Q. for their portrayal of managed care, the accuracy of the por-
trayals, and the individualistic solutions arrived at in each film.
"7 David M. Eddy, Rationing Resources While Improving Quality: How to
Get More for Less, 272 JAMA 817, 818 (1994) (arguing that trading resources from
low-value to high-value practices is an effective way to ration health care resources).
118 See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 75 ("[C]onsumers could not see HMOs'
vaunted accomplishments. Reported cost savings, for example, appeared to accrue
only to employers, plan shareholders, or well-paid CEOs---even when they were in
fact passed on, unlabeled (and therefore taken for granted), in higher take-home
pay."). See also GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST 55-73 (1996) (detailing HMO executives' extrava-
gant financial compensation).
19 For accounts of this phenomenon, see Havighurst, supra note 2, at 71. See
also Agrawal & Veit, supra note 69, at 52-53 (noting that the system continues to
lack the information and incentives needed to cause participants to make cost con-
scious choices or to require payers to offer a wide range of benefit options); Robin-
son, supra note 69, at 346-47 (noting that the key tasks in the agenda to align public
and private interests through market competition, such as purchasing alliances for
individuals and small businesses, have not been achieved); Peter D. Jacobson, Who
Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 365, 369 (2003)
(discussing how managed care failed to live up to people's expectations); John V.
Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 397, 397-99 (2003) (arguing that managed care failed to eliminate the problems it
was created to solve).
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discussed by Havighurst and others, another is worthy of note: the
extensive regulation of the market needed to achieve the social values
of managed competition, and the proposed subsidies for lower-income
patients, could not be realized because they are inconsistent with the
laissez-faire political values and interests associated with a pro-market
regime. These values and interests oppose redistributive subsidies and
pro-consumer market regulation and favor unprecedented tax cuts
and redistribution upwards to the wealthy.' 20 Indeed, this is the ver-
sion of "market competition" that has been implemented: a consider-
able shift of wealth and power from physicians and hospitals to em-
ployers, managed care entrepreneurs, and others imposing cost con-
tainment, while denying hospitalization to some patients who need
it, 12 and denial of most or all coverage to some easily targeted high
cost patients with serious illnesses, disabilities, and chronic condi-
tions.' 22 As numerous analysts have observed, the future of managed
care is quite unclear-indeed, it has been widely pronounced to be
"dead"123-and some are expecting it to be replaced, at least for sig-
nificant numbers of employees, with "consumer-driven" health cover-
age characterized by some combination of high deductibles and cost-
sharing, defined contribution by employers, and employee web-
120 For a prediction of exactly these sorts of political values associated with an
emphasis on market competition, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and
Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1108-15 (1981) (arguing that the logic
of political values associated with market competition very likely entails parsimoni-
ous redistribution, despite the theoretical possibility of generous subsidies).
121 See, e.g., Batas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 724 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (analyzing a situation where the insurer's nurse-reviewer, without consult-
ing treating physician, refused to grant extended hospitalization to pregnant patient
with Crohn's Disease). The patient could not afford to self-pay and "elect[ed]" early
discharge, only to return to hospital seven days later with high fever and severe pain.
Two days later while waiting for pre-authorization for exploratory surgery, patient's
intestine burst and required emergency removal of part of her colon; four days later,
on the basis of"Milliman & Robertson Guidelines," insurer's nurse-reviewer de-
manded that the patient be discharged. According to the Milliman and Robertson
website in 2001, http://www.milliman-hmg.com/publications/hmg/hmgqa.html, the
guidelines are "a set of optimal clinical practice benchmarks for treating common
conditions for patients who have no complications." Batas, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 9 n. 1.
122 See, e.g., Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that the insurer's reviewing physician's criteria for denial of ongoing coverage for
most physical, occupational, and speech therapy prescribed for infant with spastic
quadriplegia were neither stated nor referenced in the insurance contract, nor were
they present in the insurer's own guidelines, and holding that the denial of coverage
was in violation of applicable ERISA procedures and in violation of reviewing physi-
cian's duty as ERISA fiduciary to provide "full and fair hearing").
123 Jacobson, supra note 113, at 365; Jacobi, supra note 113, at 398, 400. See
also James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622 (2001) (finding
that a decade of managed care has yielded economic successes but political failure).
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facilitated choice among price tiers of coverage and providers . 24
These mechanisms will almost certainly further "separate[e] the fates
of people in society on various bases, including wealth, age, employ-
ment status and geography," "impai[r] the movement toward systemic
improvement of health care [quality],' 25 and diminish our experience
of compassion and social responsibility. 1
26
II. PART TWO: A FOURTH AGE FOR HEALTH LAW?
Recent developments within American health care delivery seem
to point in two different directions. As noted immediately above, the
failure to achieve the socially-responsible versions of managed com-
petition-informed and (where needed) subsidized consumers choos-
ing among plans competing (under public or private "regulation")
over quality and efficiency-may well lead to a far less structured and
egalitarian, and hence likely more dangerous market. Poorly subsi-
dized, perhaps risk-selected, and financially stressed consumers must
then "accept" high cost sharing, crudely-framed benefit exclusions,
and low-cost providers with little understanding of what they are get-
ting. Alternatively, as sharply rising health care (notably pharmaceu-
tical) costs and health insurance premiums, 27 as well as massive
losses of well-paid jobs with benefits, 28 push many lower-middle and
middle-middle class citizens into the ranks of the uninsured or under-
insured,129the political demand for governmental action of an egalitar-
124 Jon R. Gabel et al., Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More Than
Talk Now?, HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES W395 (2002), available at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/GabelWebExclI_11 2002.htm (Nov.
20, 2002) (discussing the increase in consumer-driven healthcare plans but warning
that its success has not yet been tested).
125 Jacobi, supra note 113, at 407-08.
126 Cf Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Oppor-
tunity, 6 CoNN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999-2000) (arguing that insurance creates an oppor-
tunity for people to help their neighbors through risk pooling).
127 See Pugh, supra note 81 (reporting a survey by the Kaiser Family Founda-
tion and the Health, Research and Educational Trust that "the typical family policy for
all types of health plans averaged $9,068 a year in the spring of 2003, compared with
$7,954 in the spring of 2002").
128 See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, A Statistic That's Missing: Jobs That Moved
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at A20. "[T]he high-end estimate comes from
Mark Zandi, chief economist at Economy.com, who calculates that 995,000 jobs have
been lost overseas since the last recession began in March 2001. That is 35 percent of
the total decline in employment since then. While most of the loss is in manufactur-
ing, about 15 percent is among college-trained professionals." Id.
129 E.g., Robert Pear, Big Increase Seen in People Lacking Health Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at AI (reporting Census Bureau study showing that
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ian and regulatory sort may intensify, as already appears to be happen-
ing in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election.
30
The sense of a great fork in the road between hyper-individualism
and unrestrained competition, on the one hand, and some way of re-
constituting solidarity and associated social policies, on the other, is
also reflected in the great uncertainty about the complex forces known
in shorthand as "globalization." For many, globalization is seen as
embodying and validating market competition and raising it to a level
of awesome, unprecedented power. In one starkly stated version, in-
ternationalized markets in capital and production, together with inter-
nationalized culture and communications, are said to have made the
classic "nation-state," democratic politics, social welfare policies, and
law itself virtually obsolete.' 3' National governments can no longer
enforce policies to better the economic welfare of their citizens; pro-
tectionism, high wages, taxes, and transfer payments are, the argu-
ment goes, subject to effective veto by capital, which can move itself
and jobs to other nations with great speed. 32 Moreover, even aside
from capital's "exit" option, governmental regulation and transfers
have lost much of their policy credibility, as the advocates of the mar-
ket revolution in health care argued in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus,
there is little for politics or law to decide, because "supporting the
market" is the only policy that is both empirically feasible and consis-
tent with the new transcendent value of "individual liberty." In this
view, then, there is no distinct fourth age of health law or anything
else; the market competition model has triumphed decisively.
The number of people without health insurance shot up last year by 2.4 mil-
lion, the largest increase in a decade, raising the total to 43.6 million, as
health costs soared and many workers lost coverage provided by employers
.... The increase brought the proportion of people who were uninsured to
15.2 percent, from 14.6 percent in 2001 .... [M]iddle-income households
accounted for most of the increase in the number of uninsured. In house-
holds with annual incomes of $25,000 to $74,999, the number of uninsured
people rose last year by 1.4 million, to 21.5 million, and the increase was
most noticeable among households with incomes of $25,000 to $49,999.).
130 See, e.g., Toner, supra note 4. Unlike the debate in 1993-94 over the
Clinton plan, ten years of experience with managed care has left private sector solu-
tions with far less legitimacy than they once had. Of course, the actual response of
the federal government will be greatly affected by who wins control of the presidency
and each house of Congress in the November 2004 elections.
131 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE
COURSE OF HISTORY 213-42 (2002). For a positive review of this book, see Dennis
Patterson, The New Leviathan, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2501 (2003) (forthcoming). For a
critique, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Constitutional Interpretation and the Dynamics of
World History (in progress).
132 See BOBBITT, supra note 131, at 220-21. See also Uchitelle, supra note
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The market forces associated with globalization are undeniable,
although their actual extent and impact, particularly in the United
States, are open to much debate. More fundamental is the question of
how political and legal systems can and should try to interact with
those forces. 133  It is evident even to celebrators of globalization's
benefits, such as Thomas L. Friedman of the New York Times, that
pure markets are incoherent and self-destructive; left to their own
logic, they cannot create the social cohesion, long-term investment in
human capital, and rule of law that they need for their own survival
and flourishing. Visiting post-genocide Rwanda in 1996 with then-
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, Friedman
started to get mad . . . about the budget debate that was then
going on in the U.S. Congress ..... [W]hen I listened at that
time to the infamous 1994 class of freshmen Republicans, I
heard mean-spirited voices ... voices for whom the American
government was some kind of evil enemy. I heard men and
women who insisted that the market alone should rule, and
who thought it was enough to be right about the economic
imperatives of free trade and globalization, and the rest would
take care of itself. I heard lawmakers who seemed to believe
America had no special responsibility for maintaining global
institutions, such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF,
which are critical for stabilizing an international system from
which America benefits more than any other country....
.... [The freshmen Republicans] should come to war-torn Af-
rica and get a real taste of what happens to countries where
there is no sense of community, no sense that people owe
their government anything, no sense that anyone is responsi-
ble for anyone else, and where the rich have to live behind
133 As an empirical matter, free trade and unregulated markets were not in fact
the dominant basis of economic success for newly emerging national economies from
the 1950s through the 1980s. Indeed, the Asian "economic miracles" of Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore were based on "government leadership in
industrial planning, a high degree of financial leverage, and some degree of protection
for the domestic economy, as well as the ability to control wages," GEORGE SOROS,
THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCIETY ENDANGERED 110 (1998)-the
latter meaning in some countries authoritarian and violent suppression of labor
movements. In addition to organized governmental violence, the lack of social pro-
tection demanded by market theory and practice gives rise to what Third World health
activist Dr. Paul Farmer terms "structural violence." FARMER, supra note 7, at 40.
See Amartya Sen, Forward to FARMER, supra note 7, at xii-xvi (2003) (discussing the
meaning of Farmer's phrase "structural violence").
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high walls and tinted windows, while the poor are left to the
tender mercies of the marketplace ....
.... I don't want to live in such a country, or such a world. It
is not only morally wrong, it will become increasingly dan-
gerous. 1
34
Those who struggle against the unregulated market vision hope
that globalization can develop as a kind of extended postmodernism
that will undermine not only national boundaries, but all sorts of fa-
miliar categorical oppositions, including "state regulation" and "free
markets." If "government" is indeed morphing into a branch of "the
market," so are "markets" morphing into government, with for-profit
companies running public schools, prisons, military logistics, and
much of the health care system, including a considerable portion of
Medicare and Medicaid.
Proponents of a new, what I would call "fourth age" of health law
and policy argue that the true logic of globalization should not be un-
derstood as unregulated market competition, but as a much more in-
teresting, creative, and sophisticated mix of market techniques, insti-
tutional interaction, and democratic participation. 35  Thus Carolyn
Hughes Tuohy explores in the health care context (albeit with substan-
tial reservations) new techniques known as "governance" in which
"government actors exercise influence not through command and con-
trol but through negotiation and persuasion "in the context of com-
134 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 435-36 (Anchor
Books 2000) (1999).
135 For examples of a rapidly-growing literature of this sort (whether or not
explicitly focused on globalization), see, for example., Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003) and Ar-
chon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered
Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & Soc. 5 (2001); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, Harv. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2004) (April 16, 2003 draft is available at
http://ww2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Chayes20clean.doc); Joshua Cohen &
Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/DDP.html; Andrew Gamble, The Limits
of Democracy, in REINVENTING DEMOCRACY 117, 128-30 (Paul Hirst & Sunil Khil-
nani, eds., 1996); Michael C. Dorf& Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). See also numerous works by
Roberto M. Unger, notably Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Boutwood Lectures: The
Second Way (Jan. 2002), at http://law.harvard.edu/faculty/unger/English/newwr.php.
Some of this work is discussed in MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
168-72 (2003). For an example of this general perspective applied to health policy,
see MARY RUGGIE, REALIGNMENTS IN THE WELFARE STATE: HEALTH POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND CANADA ix-xi, 1-27 & passim (1996).
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plex organizational networks."' 136 James A. Morone and Elizabeth H.
Kilbreth argue that "[a] changing social environment-marked by
globalization, immigration, a culture war, and managed care-could
be addressed by robust, local, democratic health reforms."' 137 William
M. Sage sees the health care delivery system as characterized by "in-
complete transformations"-"to industrial organization, informed
consumerism, and universality," and, therefore, driven to policy out-
comes in less than optimal litigation and judicial decisions.' 38 In these
circumstances, Sage suggests empowering "various subsystems of
'cabined discretion' apart from the courts."
These would be decision-making bodies in institutions, geo-
graphic areas, or subject matters whom users would valde for
their judgment and virtue as well as their expertise. No single
entity would dictate overall policy, and each entity would be
influenced by some combination of user exit and user voice in
addition to the decision maker's loyalty. An entity charged
with establishing a schedule of damages to be paid on a no-
fault basis for avoidable injuries in lieu of malpractice litiga-
tion would be a good test of this model.13
9
Whether any of these or other innovations is pursued evidently
depends on initiatives and developments at all levels of politics and
society.
The existing and still-to-come biotechnology revolution under-
scores in the most dramatic way the need for new frameworks of so-
cial conversation and choice, addressed elsewhere in this symposium.
Genetic privacy, access to health and life insurance, and employment
discrimination raise serious issues. 140 The prospect of well-off mem-
bers of society purchasing for themselves or their children genetically
or chemically-enhanced health, beauty, athletic ability, intelligence,
memory, and the like-something that of course already exists in a
number of ways-raises profound issues of equality, freedom, and
136 Tuohy, supra note 21, at 202. Tuohy notes that the governance model
"sits uneasily with established concepts of democratic government because lines of
accountability within networks may be multiple, tangled, and obscured." Id. at 203.
Proponents would argue that there will be new modes of democratic accountability.
137 James A. Morone & Elizabeth H. Kilbreth, Power to the People? Restor-
ing Citizen Participation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y AND L. 271, 271 (2003) (abstract).
138 William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health
Care Regulation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y AND L. 387, 414 (2003).
19 d. at 414-15.
141 See, e.g., LORi B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN, GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 592-734 (2002).
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democracy, as well as our experience of "human nature."' 41 Some
advocates of free market or "entrepreneurial" globalization see our
government and society as being constituted in a new form-a "mar-
ket-state"--characterized by "sublime indifference" to "who should
be allowed to grow taller or be endowed with perfect pitch ....
[T]he basis for human assessment in the various competitions
of the meritocracy [is shifting] from a passive acceptance of
inherited abilities to a quest for the enhanced, or engineered,
faculties made possible by molecular biology. Here, too, the
market-state's apparent indifference to the state's role in en-
suring justice fits the new, wide-open landscape of apparent
opportunity. A State that tried to sort out who [should have
access to biological enhancement] would soon find itself
hopelessly overcommitted financially or the center of group
warfare .... The market-state, with its sublime indifference
to such questions and its refusal to guarantee outcomes, is
more survivable in the new world of genetic technologies.
These technologies have the power to enhance autonomy as
never before, freeing men and women from their own genes,
and providing choices only dreamt of until now.
143
Since Bobbitt assumes that we cannot afford to grant this revolu-
tionary new autonomy to everyone, and accepts with enthusiasm that
it should be distributed according to the market, i.e. ability to pay, this
freedom is that of the privileged to become stronger and more privi-
leged in the most profound ways. Such a prospect has led Francis
Fukuyama, who celebrated the triumph of capitalism over the Soviet
Union as "the end of history,"'44 to decide that history is not quite
over.
141 See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES
OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 4-17, 216-18 (2002) (depicting a world where
people have all their desires realized but, as a result, cease to be human beings);
ANDREWS, MEHLMAN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 135, at 281-98.
142 BOBBiT-r, supra note 131, at 232.
143 id.
144 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INT., Summer 1989, at
3 (arguing that the end of the Cold War is signaling the end of history as we know it
and beginning "the final form of human government"); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE
END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY].
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We do not have to accept any of these future worlds [e.g. "far
more hierarchical and competitive," or a "soft tyranny envi-
sioned in Brave New World"] under a false banner of liberty.
... We do not have to regard ourselves as slaves to inevitable
technological progress when that progress does not serve hu-
man ends. True freedom means the freedom of political
communities to protect the values they hold most dear, and it
is that freedom that we need to exercise with regard to the
biotechnology revolution today. 1
45
The biotechnology revolution will thus pose for us with stark con-
sequences the question that "the market revolution" in health care
thought it had already answered: do we as a "political community"
have values that we "hold most dear," and what are they, or are we
primarily (exclusively?) an aggregation of individuals for whom the
meaning of freedom is choice within the scarcity of each person's
"own" resources? The fact that we are, or will be, facing this question
is itself a remarkable commentary on our recent history.
"' FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY, supra note 144, at 218.
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